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YOUR COMMUNITY GETS A B-:
ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC AND CURIOUS REALM OF
AIRPORT BOND RATINGS
by
Richard R. Hawkins
University of West Florida
Stephen A. LeMay
University of West Florida
Peter M. Ralston
Iowa State University

ABSTRACT

Commercial airports are publicly-owned transportation infrastructure, usually funded with bonds. The bond
rating decision for these entities thus has important ramifications for bond investors, issuers, airport
managers, and even the communities the airports serve, but the rating decision process is not well
understood. This paper discusses a simulation of the rating process in two decision environments, including
a downgrade. The effect of information framing in an environment of incomplete data is examined using
amateur evaluators. Amateur evaluators were utilized to understand how people with limited financial
analysis skills would respond when presented with incomplete information and a primed scenario. The
results indicate that amateur evaluators were more likely to downgrade a bond grade than a ratings agency,
but this effect was moderated for amateur evaluators with more work experience. Implications for airport
and supply chain infrastructure are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Access to financial capital for U.S. airports is a
requirement for sustained performance. Funding
can come in many forms, including airport revenue
and federal, state, and local grants (Zou et al.,
2015). Another primary source of capital for U.S.
airports continues to be the municipal bond market.
For background, bonds – like stock issues or loans
– help entities raise money. Bond issuers receive
financial capital in return for a promise to pay back
the principal plus a premium (i.e. interest) to the
capital provider. The size of this premium is usually
tied to a bond’s grade and the perceived riskiness of
the bond, essentially an assessment of the likelihood

that the issuer will default on it. A bond’s grade,
determined after a review by a credit rating agency,
can severely impact the borrowing costs of bond
issuers (Grammenos, Alizadeh, and Papapostolou,
2007). A lower grade indicates a higher level of
riskiness, and therefore a higher premium on top of
the principal must be offered to potential capital
providers. Thus, it serves a bond issuer well to earn
the most advantageous grade possible to lower the
interest payments associated with bond outlays.
The intent of the current research is to better
understand the grading process of municipal bonds
specifically utilizing airport bonds as the primary
example. Because of a lack of information deemed
important by credit ratings agencies to fully assess
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bond grades, an experiment was designed and
implemented to examine if amateur bond graders
evaluated an existing airport bond in the same
manner as professionals of a credit rating agency.
The experiment also analyzed the possible influence
of framing on decisions. This understanding is critical
because the bond grading process is opaque and
capital seekers need to fully appreciate if differences
exist between professionals and other people in an
environment where information is incomplete.
This work responds to calls for additional research
in understanding the present state of capital inputs
for the aviation industry (Fu, Homsombat, and
Oum, 2011; Zou et al., 2015). It has important
implications for airports, airport managers, municipal
budgets, and the future level of community supply
chain infrastructure. A lower bond grade limits the
ability of a municipality to borrow to maintain or
improve the condition of an airport. Thus, bond
grades can affect the size of bond outlays, the
number of bond outlays, and future behavior (i.e. a
negative experience may prevent municipal leaders
from undertaking needed improvements).
At a macro level of analysis, infrastructure (for
example: airports) plays a major role in supply chain
logistics. Yet infrastructure receives little attention in
the logistics and supply chain literature. We see few
articles on the nature and structure of ports,
airports, and other primarily publicly owned
facilities, despite their importance to the operation of
both domestic and international logistics operations
and supply chain design. Even the literature on
supply chain finance focuses on money flows and
financial arrangements related to inventory
(Hoffman, 2005; Kouvelis and Zhou, 2011;
Gelsomino et al., 2016). Further, there seems to be
little understanding of how infrastructure is funded,
where it exists, or its strategic importance not only in
developing sound supply chains and transportation
systems, but also in the global political arena (Li,,
Cui, and Lu, 2014). We also find that infrastructure
and infrastructure finance has been neglected in
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business curricula. It appears that building roads is
left to engineers, despite the crucial nature of
infrastructure to the business community and
consequently to the business student.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways:
first, it addresses the importance of infrastructure
finance and financial ratings firms; second, it
demonstrates a method for teaching the
infrastructure concepts; and third, it adds to the
body of literature in supply chain behavioral research
(Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011; Siemsen, 2011).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency Theory and Airport Managers
The classic agency problem arises when
cooperating parties have different goals to be
achieved through the same means (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). A prime
example of the principal agent problem is an
employee-employer relationship. The employer
may seek abnormal profits or growth of a company,
while an employee may simply want a paycheck and
a good quality of life. While differing goals are not
automatically a negative, the further goals are
misaligned between principals and agents, the
greater the chance for conflict and increased costs
of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Potential
agency issues can be exacerbated in airport bond
markets.
Accessing financial capital is a factor of production
which can create an array of complex relationships
among owners, managers, and creditors
(Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010). U.S.
airports finance large investment projects with
revenue bonds (Fuhr and Beckers, 2009). In
effect, airport managers serve multiple principals
when capital funds are raised through bond markets.
Airport managers report directly to city, county, or
regional commissions but act as indirect agents for
creditors for specific airport bonds. This can form a

relationship where government acts as a steward for
the private investors (Oum, Adler, and Yu. 2006),
ensuring airports work towards achieving their own
goals while also maintaining the fiduciary
responsibility of paying back borrowed funds.
The trend of financing airport projects with private
investment including bonds has actually been driven
by the “cash-in” principle of municipal governments
(Cruz and Marques, 2011). The “cash-in” strategy
refers to governments taking a relatively safe and
stable public asset, such as an airport, and
capitalizing on that asset for financial continuity
(Cruz and Sarmento, 2017). For example,
municipalities and private investors alike know that
commercial airports have a high probability of
continued operations. Both parties seek to capitalize
on this, with one accepting an investment for the
continued or improved operation of that asset, while
the other party seeks a guaranteed return on
investment. Essentially, this is the source of the
agency problem for airport managers when dealing
with multiple principals.
While their direct superiors can give airport
managers direct feedback or actionable goals, bond
investors must give feedback indirectly. Rather bond
investors either have to assume their investment is
being handled in their best interest or rely on an
outside party for judgment. These outside parties
include credit rating agencies.
Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies operate in an oligopolistic
market with little competition (LeMay, Burns, and
Hawkins, 2016). Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard
and Poor’s rate 95% of the general obligation
bonds globally (Evans, 2015). While this market
structure suggests the potential for a mixture of
collusion and forbearance, competition seems to be
fairly intense (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). This
competition is further exacerbated by a unique setup
in bond markets where the issuers themselves pay

for the credit analysis and resultant rating (Livingston
and Zhou, 2016). An obvious conflict of interest
exists because the bond issuer has long-term fiscal
incentives to select the credit rating agency which
will provide the best rating. As a result, investors
should use caution if they rely solely on credit rating
agencies’ analyses when making investment
decisions. In fact, each of the big three credit rating
agencies were found to have distorted markets and
provided an overly positive view of bonds and
securities that failed in the global financial crisis in
2007 and 2008, and again in the European
sovereign debt crisis in 2010 (Long, 2013).
Bonds are usually rated in two phases: at the initial
outlay and then through an annual “watch” phase
that can confirm or alter the original bond grade.
While competition can drive bond ratings slightly
positive at outlay, it is also the period in which the
bond grade is most fully analyzed (Bae, Kang, and
Wang, 2015). Credit rating agencies derive most of
their revenue from bond outlays, not monitoring.
The credit rating agencies also know that the most
eyes are on them at the time of bond issue, so
reputational effects may be present (Hau, Langfield,
and Marques-Ibanez, 2013). Recertifying bonds,
or altering their initial grade, accounts for a small
percentage of the earnings for credit rating agencies
(Driss, Massoud, and Roberts, Forthcoming).
Since the surveillance mechanisms are costly,
recertification usually comes after a quick review of
objective data specific to the issuer, a review
combined with subjective judgement (Raiter, 2009;
LeMay et al., 2016). This can result in multiple
problems. Of obvious concern would be bonds that
should have been downgraded, but weren’t due to
oversight. Another concern is the impact of
downgrade on an entity when the reasons for a
downgrade seem arbitrary and opaque. This is
further impacted by the potential subjective nature
of analysis. A template of criteria from all analyses
may aid rating agencies and raters when recertifying
bonds. While a standardized template can be an
obvious place to start for (re)analysis, credit rating
Vol. 29 No. 2
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agencies must judge each bond, or specific supply
chain expenditure, on that issue’s own merits (Moon
and LeBlanc, 2008).

Pairing these thoughts is critical when one also
considers that municipal bonds are notoriously
sound investments. The default risk for
municipalities is very low (Kincaid, 2016).

Municipal Bond Grading – Airports
Using municipal bonds for airports as a specific
example, Fitch applies five criteria broadly to grade
airport bonds: 1) Revenue risk – volume, 2)
Revenue risk – price, 3) Infrastructure development/
renewal, 4) Debt structure, and 5) Debt service
(Fitch 2012a). These criteria, termed “Key Rating
Drivers” or “Key Rating Factors” interchangeably,
help Fitch determine an airport’s resilience of
demand as well as an airport’s flexibility to offset the
volatility associated with the airline industry (LeMay
et al., 2016). These concepts, paired with an
airport’s actual market size, help contribute to the
grade of bonds associated with that particular
airport (Fitch, 2012a).
However, a prime contention of the current research
is that bond grades may be assigned unfairly. This
primarily stems from the fact that airport bonds have
an artificial ceiling imposed on them by Fitch (Fitch
2012a). All markets, regardless of size, have a
ceiling, with smaller markets having a progressively
lower “top” grade. This imposed anchor, along with
the knowledge that key rating factors are
subjectively interpreted, makes one assume that a
rating for a particular airport is provided based on
the judgement of the analysts assigned those
markets (LeMay et al., 2016). These judgments
can have a large impact financially, operationally,
and strategically for communities as a link has been
shown between credit ratings and borrowing costs
(Calcagno and Benefield, 2013). While a
relationship between a lower bond rating and higher
borrowing costs is probably intuitive, other factors
such as the ability to take on multiple capital
improvement projects at one time have to be
considered. Also, receiving a poor bond grade on
one project may influence the pursuit of another
project if a bond grade is required.
40
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Additionally, over half of the States in the U.S.
prevent municipalities from declaring bankruptcy
(Swedroe, 2013). On a per issuance basis,
municipal bonds fail .086% of the time where
corporate bonds fail 35.63% of the time (Appleson,
Parsons, and Haughwout, 2012). Those
percentages are based on 54,486 municipal bond
outlays for the period between 1986 and 2011
versus 5,656 corporate bonds for the same period.
Arguably, if ceilings are being imposed on bond
grades for municipalities, then perhaps floors should
be imposed as well. If municipal bonds’ failure rates
are so low, it would be assumed that changes to
bond grades during the “watch” phase would be the
result of obvious factors. A downgrade would be
triggered by known negative influences. However, it
appears that is not always the case.
Decision-Making: Framing, Anchoring and
Halo Effects
Psychological effects can influence the decisions of
those assigned to assess bonds on behalf of credit
rating agencies. Information utilized to grade bonds
is reported annually in a context that possibly
influences, at least in part, the way in which the
information is considered. Shafir, Simonson, and
Tversky (1993) identify two broad approaches to
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and
conflict: formal models and reason-based analysis.
Formal models include normative models like
expected utility theory (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 2007) and descriptive models like
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Formal models usually associate numerical values
with alternatives; such models usually either
maximize gains or minimize losses (Shafir et al.,
1993). Reason-based analyses typify business and
political discourse, notably in the interpretation of

case studies in law schools and business schools
(Shafir et al., 1993).
Unless they are quantified and consciously included
in formal models, contextual openers like priming,
anchoring, and framing have little influence on
decision-making that employs formal models.
However, such openers can clearly influence
decisions in reason-based choice. This is because
context can be a piece of information considered
when it is unclear what information is needed to
make a necessary decision. In a way, context sets
the stage and places potential boundaries around a
decision event. Context can anchor a decision
maker to a specific comparison value, or prime or
frame a decision maker’s mindset when considering
information to make a decision (Kahneman, 2011).
More complex decision environments may make the
effects of specific primes, frames, and anchors more
difficult to discern, in part because the choices
become multi-layered (Caussade et al., 2005). This
means that the influence of the opener may become
more difficult to discern if prior or later layers of
choice cover up or distort the influence of the
opener. When outcomes can vary greatly, so can the
ability of decision-makers to discriminate, especially
as the items become more difficult to categorize
(Schneider, 1995).
The grading of a bond would appear to be a
layered, complex choice. In the case of the raters at
an agency like Fitch, the watch phase may offer the
employees issuing the ratings reports little or no risk.
The employees can simply follow procedures and
incorporate information that changes the valence of
the bond from positive to negative, using the most
recent rating as an anchor point for the decision.
This leaves open the possibility that a bond that
should have been rated AAA, but was rated BBB+
by rule, would be downgraded to BBB because of
new information with minor negative effect on the
riskiness of the bond. This phenomenon may be
rooted in the behavioral economics paradigm of
anchoring. Arguably, a bond grade serves as an

anchor during a reassessment phase. Bonds are
being compared more so to their previous
assessment, rather than their actual risk of default.
In classic anchoring studies, the anchors were based
in numbers that were irrelevant to the choice at
hand. For example, Tversky and Kahneman
(Kahneman, 2011), rigged a ‘Wheel of Fortune’ to
give students one of two numbers, 10 and 65. Then
the students were asked to estimate the percentage
of African nations in the UN. Those who saw 10,
guessed that 25% of UN nations were African.
Those who saw 65, guessed that 45% were African
nations (Kahneman, 2011). Obviously, the wheel of
fortune numbers were irrelevant to the percent
estimates, but they influenced the choices anyway.
In the case of airport bond grades, we believe
existing grades to be influencing the reassessment
grade of the bond. This is problematic for many
reasons. First, as mentioned, airport bond grades
have a ceiling. Certain domestic airports may not
receive a higher grade due to broad categorization
factors that may or may not actually apply to a
specific airport. Second, we believe that not all
analysts understand that municipal bonds cannot
default, directly influencing the inherent riskiness of a
bond. If a previous bond grade can influence a
decision, so perhaps can the knowledge that default
is unlikely. Third, an airport bond grade can directly
and indirectly affect a municipality’s finances for an
extended time.
Armed with this information, the current research
sought amateur bond graders to assess a specific
instance where a bond outlay was downgraded.
Amateur graders were utilized to assess the decision
point because of the belief that the contextual
anchor of a previously issued bond grade was
playing a greater role in the bond assessment than
financial performance factors. This is because
financial information in the bond grading process can
be incomplete or subjectively interpreted. As such
examining behavioral factors like anchors become
appropriate to assess with amateur graders.
Vol. 29 No. 2
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In 2008, the city of Pensacola, FL issued nearly $36
million dollars of airport bonds for capital
improvements to the existing airport infrastructure
including airport terminal expansion and parking lot
construction. Fitch Ratings Agency was contracted
to provide a ranking on the bond issue and provided
a BBB+, the highest bond grade awarded to an
airport of Pensacola’s size (Fitch, 2012a).
Bonds are watched with an annual regrading. In this
manner, bond grades can be raised, reaffirmed, or
lowered. In 2012, the airport bonds from
Pensacola were downgraded to BBB. The primary
reasons offered for the bond downgrade were
stagnant traffic levels, a debt burden higher than
allowed for debt coverage service levels, and a lack
of cash flow from a structured airline agreement
(Fitch, 2012b). However, objective quantifiable
data on the downgrade was limited (Fitch, 2012b;
LeMay et al., 2016).
With financial data being incomplete and the
financial analysis being a subjective process, the
bond process may be impacted by different factors.
Arguably, anchors may be a reference point for
bond grades when financial information is limited. In
this case, one or two of five key ratings drivers may
be perceived as negative; but information on the
other ratings factors are incomplete. Because of
incomplete information, undue weight may be given
to where a bond is currently assessed instead of
judging how likely a bond default actually is. The
process becomes one of justifying the limited
amount of information present versus an established
metric (i.e. a bond’s current grade), instead of fully
considering the information against how likely an
entity is to declare bankruptcy. This issue may
indicate that anchoring is driving a bond’s grade
instead of the financial metrics grading agencies say
are important.
Given our understanding of the imperfect bond
grading process and the susceptibility of evaluators
42
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to forces identified in the behavioral science
literature, the authors developed two hypotheses on
the role that framing and anchoring information will
play on decisions by amateur bond graders:
H1: Provided the information that few
municipal bonds default, amateur
graders will not downgrade municipal
bonds as much as professional analysts
across similar metrics.
H2: Provided the information that few
municipal bonds default, amateur
graders with more experience in the
business world will not downgrade
municipal bond ratings as much as
amateur graders with less experience.
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
To test these hypotheses, we conducted a
behavioral experiment. Behavioral experiments
provide an opportunity to understand the nuances of
decision making (Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011).
We chose experimentation for this investigation for
three specific reasons. First, behavioral experiments
provide a high level of control to help adequately
judge causality (McGrath, 1981; Thomas et al.,
2013). Second, behavioral experiments allow us to
analyze specific cause-and-effect relationships
between variables because they grant a higher level
of control over those variables (Thomas, Esper, and
Stank, 2010). Third, we wanted to assess the
relationship between specific independent variables
and the dependent variable of bond grade. In this
instance, the research team was particularly
interested in the effect of the knowledge actual
municipal bond defaults would have on a bond
grade. We are providing a different anchor or frame
to our amateur graders and seeing if this impacts the
reason-based choice they are making in any way.
We asked a convenience sample of college
enrollees from a Florida university to analyze the

same data that Fitch Ratings published in its annual
report on a continuing airport bond. The sample
included both graduate students and undergraduate
students. The use of student samples in behavioral
supply chain research is an established methodology
(Cantor and Macdonald, 2009; Thomas et al.,
2010; Thomas et al., 2013; Mir, Aloysius, and
Eckerd, 2016; Tokar et al,. 2016). College
students are appropriate for the current research for
two primary reasons. First, we seek internal validity
by randomly assigning participants to our treatment
control (Stevens, 2011). Second, we have
specifically sought amateurs, or individuals with
minimal experience, to analyze information as it
relates to generating a bond grade (Thomas, 2011).
Thus, specific interest is focused on the decision
making of individuals who are unfamiliar with bond
grading. We examine anchoring and not quantifiable
financial analysis.
We gave the ratings exercise to 75 college students,
28 of whom were graduate students. We distinguish
between graduate and undergraduate students
because of the difference in work experience

expected between the two groups. This work
experience and understanding of business
environments may help graduate students distinguish
between the effects of anchors. Collectively, the
college students were given the five key rating
criteria that Fitch Ratings published as airport bond
rating criteria for the years covered by the data—
2010, 2011, and 2012. The 2012 review was
pertinent because that was the year that the
Pensacola Airport bond was downgraded.
The forms used for the exercise created two
different conditions. In the first condition,
participants were given the information that only 47
municipal bond issues defaulted between the years
of 1986 and 2011. In the second condition, this
information was withheld. Otherwise, the forms
used in the exercise were identical.
The forms included information on the five key
ratings criteria for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012.
The forms are shown in the Appendix to this paper.
As can be seen from the forms, the data are
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complete for all three years for some measures of
the criteria, but not for others (Fitch 2010, 2011,
and 2012b). That is because these forms contain
only the information used in Fitch press releases for
these years. The gaps in this information are shown
in Table 1. All of the published data fit into the
measures of the five ratings criteria as described by
Fitch (Fitch 2010, 2011, and 2012b).
Forty students, including 13 graduate students were
given the form that included the information about
municipal bond defaults. Thirty five students,
including 15 graduate students, were given forms
that excluded this information. Both groups were
asked to examine year-over-year changes in the
measures used to rate each criterion and then mark
it with a “+”, “-”, or “=” sign. This was intended to
summarize their judgement of the impact that
changes in the measure should have on the bond
grade. For example, for key ratings factor – revenue
risk volume – participants were given information on
enplanement base, enplanement growth, and carrier
risk for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 as this is
what appeared in the related Fitch releases. Each
participant marked the blank space next to the
measure in accordance with his or her judgement.
This process was repeated for all five ratings
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criteria. At the end of the exercise, participants were
asked to add up their plus and minus signs. Then
they were asked to grade the bond on a scale in
which they were all fluent: A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C,
C-, D, and F. They were informed that Fitch’s rating
for the bond in 2010 was B+.
The participants were guided through this process
with a PowerPoint presentation that included
definitions of the key criteria and their measures.
The participants were allowed to ask questions to
clarify these definitions and criteria. Then they
assessed the criteria one-by-one. The process took
between 35 and 45 minutes. All presentations were
given by the same member of the research team,
assisted by the other members to assure that all of
the procedures were carried out in a consistent
fashion.
From the experiment worksheets, we have created
a dependent variable for the participant’s rating
change in 2011 and one for 2012. For example, if a
student downgraded the bond one increment in
2011 – B+ to B in their vocabulary – this appears
as a negative one. We model the participant
decision with:

where all of the right hand side variables denoted
with an x are discreet (e.g., MBA student status)
and each equation ends with an error term. Details
for the variables, including mean and standard
deviation, can be found in Table 2. The only
variation across the equations occurs in the right
hand side variable y2011 for the change in grade for
the next year, y2012.
Parameter estimates from the model appear in Table
3. One variation of the model included a dummy
variable for participant gender (right side), but the
results are not sensitive to this choice in
specification. The first finding confirms the
dependent variable averages from Table 2 as the
participants downgraded the bonds (significant,
negative values for the intercept).
The results show limited support for hypothesis one
in decisions for 2011, at the p < .10 level. In other
words, students who received the low-default frame
– that 47 municipal bonds failed over the past 25
years – were somewhat less likely to downgrade.
The treatment is not significant for the 2012
decisions; the knowledge of municipal bond defaults
over the past 25 years played no role in the grade of
the Pensacola Airport bonds in 2012, a year where
Fitch Ratings actually did downgrade the bonds. In
summary, we find mixed results for hypothesis one;

it was only somewhat supported in a year where
Fitch did not downgrade.
Results indicate that amateur bond graders with
more professional experience (i.e. graduate
students) would adjust bond grades differently than
their counterparts in 2011 at the p < .10 level. The
result for 2012 is a larger and highly statistically
significant coefficient where amateur graders with
more professional experience were less likely to
downgrade. For example, the model with the
gender effect (right side of Table 3) has an intercept
of negative 1.3365 but an MBA student adjustment
of positive 1.4633. Therefore, hypothesis two is
supported.
Examining the results of the study compared to
hypothesis one indicate that anchoring respondents
to the fact that few municipal bond defaults have
occurred over the past 25 years does not influence
the decision of respondents to downgrade bonds.
Essentially, we looked to reframe a respondent’s
decision by providing amateur graders the same
incomplete financial information analysts received,
Pensacola’s current bond grade, and indicating that
municipal bonds default at an extremely low rate.
This contextual factor, the low rate of municipal
bond default, was a variable that had limited impact
on students as a whole. Perhaps respondents
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discounted this fact because they perceived that the
statement was only broadly related to their specific
bond regrade. While understandable, careful
financial analysis occurs at time of bond outlay; not
necessarily during the annual watch phase (Hau et
al. 2013). Regardless, the current bond grade
played more of a role in respondents decision to
change a bond grade than information on municipal
bond default rates.
When the student groups were separated between
undergraduate and graduate respondents, there was
a significant difference between the two respondent
bases. Graduate students were statistically
significantly less likely to downgrade a bond in the
presence of municipal bond default rate information
than their undergraduate counterparts. One possible
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reason for this explanation is the professional
experience graduate students typically bring to their
studies. Graduate students have oftentimes been
business professionals and as such may cognitively
process information differently than people with less
experience. Perhaps graduate students realize that
low municipal bond default rates indicate the
financial safety of these investments. Alternatively,
negative information would have to be perceived as
very negative if a bond downgrade was to occur. In
essence, graduate students may more fully
understand how the business operates.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Suggesting that amateur bond graders and credit
rating agency employees are the same is not

something we take lightly. The entire grading
process of municipal bonds should be analyzed,
however, because of the obvious impact bond
grades (and potential downgrades) can have on
municipalities, including both the resident population
and the firms who use the funded infrastructure.
Our amateur graders often matched the changes by
Fitch experts, even when armed with the
experimental frame of the municipal bond default
information. The graders with more professional
experience differed from our traditional
undergraduate students in that they were not as
willing to downgrade bonds in 2012. In reality,
Pensacola bonds were downgraded in 2012. While
one would hope Fitch employees would have some
experience-based knowledge that would help grade
bonds, investors truly do not know the specifics
behind why bonds are downgraded or upgraded.
In other words, positive or negative changes for a
particular metric do not convey any sense of weight.
It is understandable why researchers lack full clarity
on the bond grading process since Fitch competes
with other credit rating agencies. However, this lack
of clarity can sometimes surprise a bond-issuer.
Alternatively, the bond grade ceiling seems arbitrary.
Fitch press releases note the size of the airport as a
potential cap to the liquidity of an airport, with larger
airports eligible for higher grades. Regardless of
fairness, it is important to question if this standard
accurately reflects the risk of a bond grade. Finally,
one must wonder if agencies should even grade
municipal bonds after issue. As mentioned, the
failure rate is miniscule.
Bond grades clearly affect the perception of airport
management. Steady or rising bond grades may
have a positive effect on the perception of airport
managers and the job they are doing, but a
downgrade is likely to be seen as a loss, so
downgrades can have serious repercussions for
airport managers including loss of employment
(known outcome from the Pensacola Airport Bond
downgrade). This negative outcome is especially

disturbing if the exact reasons for a bond
downgrade are unknown.
Another impact of bond grades is on a municipality
seeking to raise capital for infrastructure funding,
which remains a critical global issue (Spychalski,
2011; Love, Ahiaga-Dagbui, and Irani 2016).
Bond grades directly affect interest rate charges for
a municipality and impact the amount of funding
sought. A higher grade signals less risk for a bond
issue and usually lowers the interest rate, and
therefore interest rate payments, associated with
bonds. A lower grade signifies that bonds may be
riskier and typically raises the interest rate, and
interest rate payments, associated with bonds. The
obvious losers in this situation are constituents who
reside in the locale where a bond issue is being
considered. A lower grade may signify that
municipal taxes will have to be raised to pay for the
higher interest rates. Alternatively, and as a result of
a potential lower credit rating, the amount of the
bond issue may have to be lowered, thus affecting
the actual capital project deemed important to the
municipality.
Such bond grades also affect other users of facilities
funded by these bonds, not just the local managers
and residents. For example, UPS and FedEx build
sort facilities across the country. These facilities tie
the companies to a certain location. A lower bond
grade increases the price of new transportation
infrastructure. It may have an immediate impact on
already planned future projects and potentially alter
future proposals. This can be a dire situation for a
civic area that could fund infrastructure projects that
were appropriately rated, but has to wait to pay off
higher than necessary financial obligations. Time is
at a premium in municipalities where capital projects
can take many years from planning to completion
(Xiao, Fu, and Zhang, 2016). That is why
eliminating bias in bond-rating decisions is so
important.
Please note, we are not suggesting artificially high
grades for risky bonds. Rather, we are imploring
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credit rating agencies to adequately assess the rating
process, including considering new key rating factors
with or without a contractual obligation to do so.
Eliminating the surprise from a downgrade is, in our
view, an absolute necessity. Thus, the agencies should
provide clarity to municipalities and investors as to
why a downgrade is happening. As downgrades
occur now, language seems obtuse as to why
downgrades actually happen. There is an unfortunate
social exclusion process at work (i.e. lower current,
and lower future access to, supply chain infrastructure)
with limited objectifiable support (Schwanen et al.,
2015). Therefore credit rating agencies must be
explicit as jobs, new charges to taxpayers, and other
supply chain infrastructure funding can be at stake.
In addition, in this complex process, there is little
doubt that behavioral biases and effects play a major
role, one that varies from context to context. We have
two areas of concern here. First, the presentation of
information – such as the frame used in this study –
should have no impact on future air travel for a
community. The reader should recall from Table 1 that
information for several of the Fitch criteria were not
complete in the press releases for 2010 through 2012,
meaning the presentation of information was not
complete and can be viewed as a frame (perhaps
unintentional, perhaps not).
Second, Fitch limits an airport like PNS to a BBB+
rating, despite the absence of defaults among bonds
issued by such airports. This limit itself may be a
function of a bias that relies on a simple concept:
bigger is better, so smaller is worse. With this as an
underlying given, the data that has accumulated over
time does not matter, even if it supports the idea that
such airports offer no more risk than larger airports.
Thus, grading behavior can become imprinted over
time which may impact bond grades to a greater
extent than objective historical data, so the taxpayers
in the area covered by the airport still end up paying
more for their bond issue than the taxpayers in an area
covered by a larger airport (Davis-Sramek et al.,
2017).
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The possibility of imprint means another framing
effect could influence the process, the halo effect.
Halo effects differ from anchors in the sense that
the former are more general than anchoring and
adjustment effects (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).
In the current case, the presence of the city name,
Pensacola, may bias the subject’s grade of the
bonds because they already have an opinion of
the city or an opinion of the airport. For example,
could someone’s knowledge of Pensacola being
on the Gulf Coast be paired with BPs oil spill,
negatively impacting bond grades even if
objective material states the two are unrelated?
Offering the same objective operational
information about an unidentified airport might
produce a different set of results and the role of
halo effects is a potential subject for future
research.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the current research was to
explore bond grading procedures and investigate
the impact they may have on airports and
municipal bond outlays. Behavioral information
was presented to show how biasing effects can
occur during subjective analysis. While subjective
analysis may not be prevented, an example is
offered to show how one decision can have a
severe impact on the financial needs of
communities when using municipal bonds to
finance key transportation infrastructure. In the
current study providing a new anchor to amateur
graders , that of the low rates of municipal bond
defaults, did not impact graders’ decisions to
lower a bond assessment. However, when
amateur graders were separated between
perceived experience levels more experienced
graders were less likely to downgrade municipal
bonds as compared to their less experienced
counterparts. Truly the results indicate that
professional with more experience ignore
contextual anchors, or process them differently.

The current study uses undergraduate and graduate
students as respondents. While the students can
certainly respond to behavioral stimuli, assessing
financial analysts under the same experimental
conditions would lend further credence to the
current results. Additionally, examining a different
bond downgrade would also be helpful. Future
research should look to address these issues. Future
research could also examine how bond downgrades
influence capital projects within communities.
Another suggestion is to examine the cost of initial
capital for municipalities after a well-publicized,
unrelated municipal default. Regardless, further
examination of behavioral science factors and
supply chain capital is needed.
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